Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

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Show simple item record Castro, Luciano I. de
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2007-05-25T10:31:45Z 2007-05-25T10:31:45Z 2007-04
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.
dc.format.extent 570314 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 07-22
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Affiliation
dc.subject.other Dependence of types
dc.subject.other Auctions
dc.subject.other Pure strategy equilibrium
dc.subject.other Revenue ranking
dc.title Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we074622
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