RT Generic
T1 Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions
A1 Castro, Luciano I. de
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usuallytreated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption inthree senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a veryrestrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’smain implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence.From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibriumexistence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue rankingof auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributionsconsidered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterizationof PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenuedifferences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2007
FD 2007-04
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/831
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/831
LA eng
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 28 abr. 2024