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The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4219
ISSN: 1432-0479 (Online)
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050203
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the-least_ET_1998_ps.pdf (427.1 KB)
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1998-04
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Springer
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We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
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Economic Theory. 1998, vol. 11, nº 3, p. 585-601
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