The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games

Publication:
The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Einy, Ezra
dc.contributor.author	Monderer, Dov
dc.contributor.author	Moreno, Diego
dc.date.accessioned	2009-05-14T13:26:04Z
dc.date.available	2009-05-14T13:26:04Z
dc.date.issued	1998-04
dc.description.abstract	We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
dc.description.status	Publicado
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Economic Theory. 1998, vol. 11, nº 3, p. 585-601
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s001990050203
dc.identifier.issn	1432-0479 (Online)
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4219
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Springer
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050203
dc.rights	© Springer
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
dc.type	research article	*
dc.type.review	PeerReviewed
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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