Publication: The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Economía | es |
dc.contributor.author | Einy, Ezra | |
dc.contributor.author | Monderer, Dov | |
dc.contributor.author | Moreno, Diego | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-05-14T13:26:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2009-05-14T13:26:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1998-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel. | |
dc.description.status | Publicado | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Economic Theory. 1998, vol. 11, nº 3, p. 585-601 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s001990050203 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-0479 (Online) | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4219 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Springer | |
dc.relation.publisherversion | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050203 | |
dc.rights | © Springer | |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
dc.subject.eciencia | Economía | |
dc.title | The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games | |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.review | PeerReviewed | |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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