RT Journal Article
T1 The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
A1 Einy, Ezra
A1 Monderer, Dov
A1 Moreno, Diego
AB We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
PB Springer
SN 1432-0479 (Online)
YR 1998
FD 1998-04
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4219
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4219
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024