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Existence and Nash implementation of effcient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3796
ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100117
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CORCHON_2002_19_2_CL-ps.pdf (310.27 KB)
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2002
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Springer
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Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous)input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.
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Social Choice and Welfare. 2002, vol. 19, nº 2, p. 369-379
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