RT Journal Article
T1 Existence and Nash implementation of effcient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
A1 Corchón, Luis C.
A1 Puy, M. Socorro
AB Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous)input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.
PB Springer
SN 1432-217X
YR 2002
FD 2002
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3796
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3796
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024