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Existence and Nash implementation of effcient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.authorPuy, M. Socorro
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-11T09:32:21Z
dc.date.available2009-03-11T09:32:21Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.description.abstractSuppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous)input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSocial Choice and Welfare. 2002, vol. 19, nº 2, p. 369-379
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s003550100117
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/3796
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/kkqm0ktppeev3ww8/fulltext.pdf
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550100117
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleExistence and Nash implementation of effcient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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