Publication:
A fair procedure in a marriage market

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2021-01-13
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Abstract
We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.
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Two-Sided Matching, Fair Procedure, Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
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