RT Generic
T1 A fair procedure in a marriage market
A1 Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay
A1 Romero-Medina, Antonio
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2021
FD 2021-01-13
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/31711
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/31711
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 abr. 2024