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A fair procedure in a marriage market

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorKuvalekar, Aditya Vijay
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-13T16:08:33Z
dc.date.available2021-01-13T16:08:33Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-13
dc.description.abstractWe propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.en
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/31711
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001861es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper. Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries21-01
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD41
dc.subject.otherTwo-Sided Matchingen
dc.subject.otherFair Procedureen
dc.subject.otherDeferred Acceptance Algorithmen
dc.titleA fair procedure in a marriage marketen
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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