Publication: Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences
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2017-06-01
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Elsevier
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Abstract
In this work we characterize equilibrium introduced in configurations for networks with conflicting preferences. We use the model Hernandez et al. (2013) to study the effect of three main factors: the strength of individual preferences, the level of integration in the network, and the intensity of conflict in the population. Our aim is to understand how likely is it that social outcomes are either those in which preferences dominate choices or those in which some individuals sacrifice their preferences to achieve consensus with others. Our results show that, the stronger individual preferences, the harder to achieve consensus in choices. However, in cases where the payoff ratio is less extreme, full coordination (consensus) is always an equilibrium. Finally, if the level of conflict is low, individual preferences become less relevant and all players choosing what they prefer is not an equilibrium anymore. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Coordination games, Strategic complementarities, Consensus, Networks, Games
Bibliographic citation
Economics letters, 2017, 155, pp. 154-156