Publication:
Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.affiliation.grupoinvUC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)es
dc.contributor.authorHernández, Penélope
dc.contributor.authorMartínez Cánovas, Guillem
dc.contributor.authorMuñoz-Herrera, Manuel
dc.contributor.authorSánchez, Angel
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.contributor.funderEuropean Commissionen
dc.contributor.funderUniversidad Carlos III de Madrides
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-17T07:10:31Z
dc.date.available2020-07-17T07:10:31Z
dc.date.issued2017-06-01
dc.description.abstractIn this work we characterize equilibrium introduced in configurations for networks with conflicting preferences. We use the model Hernandez et al. (2013) to study the effect of three main factors: the strength of individual preferences, the level of integration in the network, and the intensity of conflict in the population. Our aim is to understand how likely is it that social outcomes are either those in which preferences dominate choices or those in which some individuals sacrifice their preferences to achieve consensus with others. Our results show that, the stronger individual preferences, the harder to achieve consensus in choices. However, in cases where the payoff ratio is less extreme, full coordination (consensus) is always an equilibrium. Finally, if the level of conflict is low, individual preferences become less relevant and all players choosing what they prefer is not an equilibrium anymore. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.en
dc.description.sponsorshiphis work was supported by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, MEC Spain (ECO2013-46550-R), the Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/054) and the European Commission H2020FETOpenRIA662725.en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationEconomics letters, 2017, 155, pp. 154-156
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.004
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage154
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage156
dc.identifier.publicationtitleEconomics lettersen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume155
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/30710
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000020044
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2013-46550-R
dc.relation.projectIDinfoeu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/FETOpenRIA662725
dc.rights©2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
dc.rights.accessRightsrestricted access
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticases
dc.subject.otherCoordination gamesen
dc.subject.otherStrategic complementaritiesen
dc.subject.otherConsensusen
dc.subject.otherNetworksen
dc.subject.otherGamesen
dc.titleEquilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferencesen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionVoR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
equilibrium_EL_2016.pdf
Size:
393.65 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
DM - GISC - Artículos de Revistas
OpenAIRE: Open Access Infrastructure for Research in Europe
Proyectos FOS (2019-2020)