RT Journal Article
T1 Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences
A1 Hernández, Penélope
A1 Martínez Cánovas, Guillem
A1 Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel
A1 Sánchez, Angel
AB In this work we characterize equilibrium introduced in configurations for networks with conflicting preferences. We use the model Hernandez et al. (2013) to study the effect of three main factors: the strength of individual preferences, the level of integration in the network, and the intensity of conflict in the population. Our aim is to understand how likely is it that social outcomes are either those in which preferences dominate choices or those in which some individuals sacrifice their preferences to achieve consensus with others. Our results show that, the stronger individual preferences, the harder to achieve consensus in choices. However, in cases where the payoff ratio is less extreme, full coordination (consensus) is always an equilibrium. Finally, if the level of conflict is low, individual preferences become less relevant and all players choosing what they prefer is not an equilibrium anymore. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
PB Elsevier
SN 0165-1765
YR 2017
FD 2017-06-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/30710
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/30710
LA eng
NO his work was supported by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, MEC Spain (ECO2013-46550-R), the Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/054) and the European Commission H2020FETOpenRIA662725.
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