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The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25190
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3
UXXI: AR/0000020291
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value_moreno_ET_2017_ps.pdf (819.74 KB)
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2017-04-01
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Springer Verlag
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Abstract
Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players' cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow&-Pratt curvature of d, Rd,Rd, determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If RdRd is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if RdRd is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive).
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Tullock contests, Common values, Value of public information
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Einy, E., Moreno, D. and Shitovitz, B. (2017). The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests. Economic Theory, v. 63, n. 4, pp. 925-942.
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