The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

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Show simple item record Moreno, Diego Einy, Ezra Shitovitz, Benyamin 2017-09-05T17:32:25Z 2018-04-04T22:00:06Z 2017-04-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Einy, E., Moreno, D. and Shitovitz, B. (2017). The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests. Economic Theory, v. 63, n. 4, pp. 925-942.
dc.identifier.issn 0938-2259
dc.description.abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players' cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow&-Pratt curvature of d, Rd,Rd, determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If RdRd is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if RdRd is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive).
dc.description.sponsorship Einy acknowledges financial support of the Israel Science Foundation, grant 648/2. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, grant ECO2011-29762
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer Verlag
dc.rights © Springer Verlag
dc.subject.other Tullock contests
dc.subject.other Common values
dc.subject.other Value of public information
dc.title The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
dc.type article
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel D44
dc.subject.jel D88
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2011-29762.
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 925
dc.identifier.publicationissue 4
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 942
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Economic theory
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 63
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000020291
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