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The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorMoreno, Diego
dc.contributor.authorEiny, Ezra
dc.contributor.authorShitovitz, Benyamin
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-05T17:32:25Z
dc.date.available2018-04-04T22:00:06Z
dc.date.issued2017-04-01
dc.description.abstractConsider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players' cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow&-Pratt curvature of d, Rd,Rd, determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If RdRd is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if RdRd is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive).en
dc.description.sponsorshipEiny acknowledges financial support of the Israel Science Foundation, grant 648/2. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, grant ECO2011-29762en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationEiny, E., Moreno, D. and Shitovitz, B. (2017). The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests. Economic Theory, v. 63, n. 4, pp. 925-942.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage925es
dc.identifier.publicationissue4es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage942es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleEconomic theoryen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume63es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/25190
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000020291
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/18207
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2011-29762.es
dc.rights© Springer Verlagen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelD44
dc.subject.jelD88
dc.subject.otherTullock contestsen
dc.subject.otherCommon valuesen
dc.subject.otherValue of public informationen
dc.titleThe value of public information in common-value Tullock contestsen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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