RT Journal Article
T1 The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
A1 Moreno, Diego
A1 Einy, Ezra
A1 Shitovitz, Benyamin
AB Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete  information in which the players' cost of effort is the product of a  random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow&-Pratt curvature of d,  Rd,Rd, determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If RdRd is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if RdRd is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive).
PB Springer Verlag
SN 0938-2259
YR 2017
FD 2017-04-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25190
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25190
LA eng
NO Einy acknowledges financial support of the Israel Science Foundation, grant 648/2. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, grant ECO2011-29762
DS e-Archivo
RD 25 may. 2024