Publication: O axioma da Suprema Corte Brasileira como legisladora negativa
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2017-02-13
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Abstract
A supremacia e rigidez da Constituição Federal de 1988 atuam como base e premissas na apreciação da jurisdição constitucional. Esta, por sua vez, atua para prevenir sua violação e reprimir seu desconhecimento, elementos essenciais no Estado Democrático de Direito, possibilitando a justiça, paz social e a proteção de direitos fundamentais. Nessa esteira, o sistema brasileiro de fiscalização da constitucionalidade adota, como regra geral, o controle de Constitucionalidade pelo Poder Judiciário. Contudo, verifica-se que há atualmente uma forte tensão entre os três poderes: Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário. Grande parte dessa tensão tem sido atribuída exatamente pela interferência jurisdicional da Suprema Corte nas atividades do Executivo e Legislativo. É nesse contexto, de instabilidade das instituições representativas dos Poderes, que o presente estudo aponta as discussões pertinentes aos conceitos de democracia e direito, para posteriormente compreender as controvérsias acerca de constitucionalismo e jurisdição constitucional, com o escopo de dirimir mais concretamente a função legiferante da Justiça Constitucional, notadamente o Supremo Tribunal Federal, enquanto Guardião máximo da Constituição Federal.
The supremacy and rigidity of the Federal Constitution of 1988 act as a basis and premises in the appreciation of the constitutional jurisdiction, to prevent its violation and to repress its ignorance, essential elements in the Democratic State of Law, enabling justice and social peace, as well as the protection of rights Fundamental principles. In this wake, the Brazilian system of constitutionality control adopts, as a general rule, the control of Constitutionality by the Judiciary. However, there is a strong tension between the three branches: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. Much of this tension has been attributed precisely by the Supreme Court's interference in the Executive and Legislative activities. It is in this context, from the instability of the Institutions representative of the Powers, that the present study points the discussions pertinent to the concepts of democracy and law, to later understand the controversies about constitutionalism and constitutional jurisdiction, with the scope to more concretely resolve the legifi- Constitutional Justice, notably the Federal Supreme Court, as the maximum Guardian of the Federal Constitution.
The supremacy and rigidity of the Federal Constitution of 1988 act as a basis and premises in the appreciation of the constitutional jurisdiction, to prevent its violation and to repress its ignorance, essential elements in the Democratic State of Law, enabling justice and social peace, as well as the protection of rights Fundamental principles. In this wake, the Brazilian system of constitutionality control adopts, as a general rule, the control of Constitutionality by the Judiciary. However, there is a strong tension between the three branches: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. Much of this tension has been attributed precisely by the Supreme Court's interference in the Executive and Legislative activities. It is in this context, from the instability of the Institutions representative of the Powers, that the present study points the discussions pertinent to the concepts of democracy and law, to later understand the controversies about constitutionalism and constitutional jurisdiction, with the scope to more concretely resolve the legifi- Constitutional Justice, notably the Federal Supreme Court, as the maximum Guardian of the Federal Constitution.
Description
Comunicación presentada en el Seminario Internacional en Cultura de la Legalidad: Los desafíos del Estado de Derecho en el siglo XXI, celebrado en Getafe (Madrid) el 13 de febrero de 2017 y organizado por el Grupo de Investigación sobre el Derecho y la Justicia (GIDYJ) de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Keywords
Democracia, Tribunal Constitucional, Supremo Tribunal Federal, Controle de Constitucionalidade, Separação dos Poderes, Legislador Negativo, Legislador Positivo, Democracy, Constitutional Court, Supreme Constitutional Court, Constitutionality Control, Separation of Powers, Negative Legislator, Positive Legislator