Publication:
Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7221
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we002107.PDF (1.79 MB)
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2000-02
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Abstract
In this paper. I characterize the set of Bayesian incentive compatible anonymous mechanisms in a discrete public good problem when preferences are private information. With this result in hand, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms as voting schemes in which votes are weighted according to the tax paid by each agent.
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Public goods, Voting mechanisms, Interim efficiency
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online