RT Generic
T1 Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework
A1 Pérez-Nievas, Mikel
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB In this paper. I characterize the set of Bayesian incentive compatible anonymousmechanisms in a discrete public good problem when preferences are private information.With this result in hand, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms as voting schemes in which votes are weighted according to the tax paid by each agent.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2000
FD 2000-02
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7221
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7221
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024