Sequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem

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dc.contributor.author Alcalde, J.
dc.contributor.author Romero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.other IVIE
dc.date.accessioned 2009-11-02T16:24:56Z
dc.date.available 2009-11-02T16:24:56Z
dc.date.issued 1999
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5627
dc.description.abstract This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic matching prodedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student´optimal allocation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working papers
dc.relation.ispartofseries AD 99-16
dc.relation.isversionof http://hdl.handle.net/10016/6126
dc.relation.hasversion http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5594
dc.rights ©IVIE
dc.subject.other Matching
dc.subject.other Implementation
dc.subject.other mechanism design
dc.title Sequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version submitedVersion
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