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Sequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorAlcalde, J.
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.otherIVIE
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-02T16:24:56Z
dc.date.available2009-11-02T16:24:56Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic matching prodedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student´optimal allocation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/5627
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/5594
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAD 99-16
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/6126
dc.rights©IVIE
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherMatching
dc.subject.otherImplementation
dc.subject.othermechanism design
dc.titleSequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem
dc.typeworking paper*
dc.type.hasVersionSMUR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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