Publication:
Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25137
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.0066
UXXI: AR/0000019987
Files
reserve_moreno_EL_2017_ps.pdf (768.92 KB)
Publication date
2017-05-01
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Elsevier
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rs below the revenue maximizing reserve price ro. Further, r(p) < r(s). Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c < r(p) < r(s) < r(0). (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Description
Keywords
Second-price auctions, Endogenous entry, Public and secret reserve prices, Risk aversion
Bibliographic citation
Moreno, D., Wooders, J., (2017). Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse.Economics Letters, v. 154, pp. 6-9.
Collections
DE - Artículos de Revistas