RT Journal Article
T1 Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse
A1 Moreno, Diego
A1 Wooders, John
AB We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rs below the revenue maximizing reserve price ro. Further, r(p) < r(s). Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c < r(p) < r(s) < r(0). (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
PB Elsevier
SN 0165-1765
YR 2017
FD 2017-05-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25137
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25137
LA eng
NO Moreno acknowledges financial support from the MinisterioEconomía y Competitividad (Spain), grants ECO2014-55953-Pand MDM2014-0431, and from the Comunidad de Madrid, grantS2015/HUM-3444. Wooders is grateful for financial support fromthe Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects fundingscheme (project number DP140103566).
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