Publication: Random topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts
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2011-04
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IOPscience
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Abstract
We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence
of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the onedimensional
Euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the
value of one parameter (the probability p of adding a link between two nodes
not already connected in the Euclidean configuration). We show that there
is a region of values of p in which cooperation is greatly enhanced, whilst for
smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for
p → 1− cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that
provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling
the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promoting (or suppressing) cooperation.
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Game-theory, Models for evolution, Applications to game theory and mathematical economics, Interacting agent models
Bibliographic citation
Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, abril 2011, P04019 (15 pgs.)