RT Journal Article
T1 Random topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts
A1 Vilone, Daniele
A1 Sánchez, Angel
A1 Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús
AB We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergenceof cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game(PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the onedimensionalEuclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing thevalue of one parameter (the probability p of adding a link between two nodesnot already connected in the Euclidean configuration). We show that thereis a region of values of p in which cooperation is greatly enhanced, whilst forsmaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and forp → 1− cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments thatprovide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveilingthe mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promoting (or suppressing) cooperation.
PB IOPscience
SN 1742-5468
YR 2011
FD 2011-04
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/15023
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/15023
LA eng
NO DV was supported in part by a postdoctoral contract from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. AS was supported in part by grants MOSAICO and Complexity-NET RESINEE (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain) and MODELICO-CM (Comunidad de Madrid, Spain). JG-G was supported by the MICINN through the Ramón y Cajal programme and grants FIS2008-01240 and MTM2009-13838.
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 jul. 2024