Publication: Essays on firm dynamics
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2013-10-31
Defense date
2013-12-10
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Abstract
En mi tesis doctoral, se desarrollan modelos de dinámica de fi rmas para estudiar
los determinantes de la integración vertical dentro y entre industrias, el efecto de
políticas que dependen del tamaño de las firmas, y el impacto de la regulación dual
en el mercado de trabajo sobre la productividad agregada y la distribución de firmas.
En el primer capítulo, Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Model of Industry Equilibrium , se desarrolla un modelo estocástico
de una industria con empresas heterogéneas que interactúan como compradoras y
vendedoras de insumos en un contexto con fricciones de mercado las cuales inducen
un problema de "hold-up" a los productores de bienes nales. El modelo genera un comportamiento consistente con nuevos hechos empíricos sobre integración
vertical los cuales indican que las empresas verticalmente integradas son más productivas, más grandes y están formadas por las mejores empresas productoras de
insumos (en términos de tamaño y productividad). En este contexto, la estructura
vertical de una industria emerge como resultado de decisiones optimas de inversión bajo incertidumbre. Las firmas eligen entre integrarse verticalmente, invertir
en establecer relaciones con proveedores de insumos especializados o simplemente
comprar insumos estandarizados. Dicho marco teórico provee un contexto natural
para abordar diversas cuestiones relevantes: Porque las relaciones verticales varían
entre industrias así como entre firmas dentro de cada industria? Porque no todas
las empresas grandes se integran verticalmente? Cuáles son los efectos de cambios
en las propiedades del proceso estocástico que gobierna los shocks a nivel rma sobre la estructura vertical de una industria? Encontramos que mayor incertidumbre
está asociada con mayor probabilidad de tercerización de la producción de insumos;
fi rmas verticalmente integradas son más grandes y más e cientes; firmas productoras del bien nal que son idénticas en tamaño pueden diferir en su estructura
vertical; e idénticas fi rmas verticalmente integradas pueden evolucionar diferencialmente (desintegrarse o permanecer integradas). También se analizan los efectos que cambios en los costos de integrarse tienen sobre el bienestar, y la producción y productividad agregada.
En el segundo capítulo, Dual Employment Protection Legislation and
the Size Distribution of Firms (con Andrés Erosa), se desarrolla un modelo
de dinámica de rmas con fricciones de búsqueda y costos de despido asimétricos
para los trabajadores temporarios y permanentes (legislación dual de la protección en el mercado laboral). Se caracteriza la composición de equilibrio de fi rmas con
diferente crecimiento de productividad a lo largo de su ciclo de vida, y se estudian los
efectos de la legislación dual sobre la distribución de tamaño y productividad de las
fi rmas. Los resultados indican que un mayor costos de despido para los trabajadores
permanentes juega un rol similar al de un impuesto sobre las empresas grandes y un
subsidio sobre las empresas chicas (similar efecto al de políticas que dependen del
tamaño de las firmas, "size-dependent policies") distorsionando la selección de fi rmas
y la asignación de recursos entre firmas. De esta manera cambios en la regulación
del mercado de trabajo que inducen un mayor empleo de trabajadores temporales
genera una caída en la productividad total de los factores. Consistentemente con
la evidencia presentada en el actual trabajo de investigación, a pesar de observar
similares niveles de productividad por tamaño de fi rma, países con legislación dual en
el mercado de trabajo que incentivan el uso de contratos temporales presentan una
mayor fracción de firmas pequeñas (que concentran a su vez una mayor proporción
del empleo total) y menor productividad agregada. En este sentido, el modelo brinda
una nueva perspectiva sobre los determinantes de las diferencias en la distribución
del tamaño de rmas entre países.
En el tercer capítulo, Size-Dependent Policies and Vertical Integration ,
motivado por evidencia empírica reciente que indica que los países en desarrollo
tienen menos fi rmas verticalmente integradas y que dichas rmas son más productivas y grandes, se desarrolla un modelo dinámico con fi rmas heterogéneas que interactúan como compradoras y vendedoras de insumos, con decisiones endógenas de
integración vertical, y fricciones de mercado. En este modelo la estructura vertical
de las fi rmas resulta de decisiones óptimas de inversión bajo incertidumbre. Luego
se calibra el modelo a la industria manufacturera de Estados Unidos para cuan-
ti car el impacto de políticas tamaño dependientes ("size-dependent policies") en
la asignación de recursos entre firmas determinando diferencias en la productividad
agregada. Dichas políticas son modeladas como impuestos sobre la producción y el
empleo de mano de obra que las fi rmas con escala por encima de un cierto nivel
deben pagar. Las distorsiones sobre el nivel de producción y empleo generan una
reasignación de recursos (trabajadores) desde rmas grandes a rmas pequeñas y
actúan como una barrera a la integración vertical. Los resultados indican que un
impuesto del 5% a la producción sobre fi rmas con productividad por encima de la
media genera una caída en la fracción de fi rmas verticalmente integradas desde un
8.7% a un 7%, una caída de la productividad agregada del 2.9%, y un incremento del
11% en el tamaño medio de las fi rmas. Un impuesto al empleo de mano de obra del
15% genera una caída en la fracción de firmas verticalmente integradas desde 8.6%
a 7.1%, una caída de la productividad agregada del 2.4% y una caída del tamaño
medio de fi rma del 1.2%.
In my thesis, "Essays on Firm Dynamics", I develop different models of fi rm heterogeneity and fi rm dynamics to investigate the determinants of vertical integration across industries and across fi rms within industries, as well as the impact of size-dependent policies and dual employment protection legislation on the size distribution of firms and aggregate productivity In the first chapter, Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Model of Industry Equilibrium , motivated by the empirical fact that vertically integrated producers are more productive, bigger and are matched to better suppliers (with high productivity and size), I develop a dynamic stochastic model of an industry with heterogeneous rms interacting as buyers and sellers, and market frictions that induce a hold-up problem to the manufacturers to account for these facts. In the model economy, an industrial structure emerges as the result of optimal investment decisions that rms undertake under uncertainty. Firms choose whether to integrate, link to external sellers or buy inputs in the market. This theoretical environment provides a natural framework to answer several questions: why do supply relations vary across industries and across firms within industries? Why aren t all large rms vertically integrated? How do changes in the properties of uncertainty at rm level determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of an industry? We fi nd that higher uncertainty is associated with higher likelihood of outsourcing; vertically integrated rms are larger and more efficient; otherwise identical downstream fi rms may differ in their vertical structure, and those that are vertically integrated can end up disintegrated or remain integrated. We also analyze the effects of changes in costs of vertical integration and outsourcing on welfare, aggregate output and productivity. In the second chapter, Dual Employment Protection Legislation and the Size Distribution of Firms , (joint paper with Andrés Erosa), we develop a theoretical model of rm dynamics with search frictions and asymmetric ring costs for temporary and permanent workers (dual employment protection legislation). We characterize the equilibrium labor composition that firms with different productivity growth rate choose over their life cycle, and we study the effect of dual employment protection legislation on the distribution of rms size and productivity. The results indicate that high relative ring costs for permanent workers play similar role as a tax to big rms and a subsidy to small rms (size-dependent-policies) by distorting fi rm selection as well as the allocation of resources across firms. Therefore, changes in the regulation that induce a higher use of temporary workers generate a decline in the level of TFP. Consistent with the evidence also documented in this paper, in spite of having similar labor productivity by fi rms size-classes, countries with dual employment protection legislation that incentives or extend the use of temporary contracts have relatively smaller firms (that concentrate a higher fraction of employment), and lower aggregate productivity. In this sense the model gives new insights into the sources of the considerable differences in the fi rm-size distributions across countries. In the third chapter, Size-Dependent Policies and Vertical Integration , motivated by the fact that developing countries have fewer vertically integrated fi rms than more developed countries; and vertically integrated rms are more productive and bigger, I develop a dynamic model of an industry with heterogeneous fi rms interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs, endogenous vertical integration, and market frictions. In the model economy, the vertical industrial structure emerges endogenously as the result of optimal investment decisions that firms undertake. I calibrate the model to the US economy to quantify the impact of size-dependent policies on the reallocation of resources across firms determining differences in total factor productivity. Size-dependent policies are modeled as taxes on output or labor costs that establishments above a certain size have to pay. Distortions on production and employment generate a reallocation of resources (employment) from big firms to small fi rms and act as barriers to vertical integration. I fi nd that a 15% output tax on firms that are above mean level of productivity generates a decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from 8.7% to 7%, a decrease in TFP of 2.9%, and an increase of 11% in the mean size of firms. A 15% tax on employment generates a decline in the fraction of vertically integrated firms from 8.6% to 7.1%, a decrease in TFP of 2.4% and a decline of 1.2% in the mean size of firms
In my thesis, "Essays on Firm Dynamics", I develop different models of fi rm heterogeneity and fi rm dynamics to investigate the determinants of vertical integration across industries and across fi rms within industries, as well as the impact of size-dependent policies and dual employment protection legislation on the size distribution of firms and aggregate productivity In the first chapter, Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Model of Industry Equilibrium , motivated by the empirical fact that vertically integrated producers are more productive, bigger and are matched to better suppliers (with high productivity and size), I develop a dynamic stochastic model of an industry with heterogeneous rms interacting as buyers and sellers, and market frictions that induce a hold-up problem to the manufacturers to account for these facts. In the model economy, an industrial structure emerges as the result of optimal investment decisions that rms undertake under uncertainty. Firms choose whether to integrate, link to external sellers or buy inputs in the market. This theoretical environment provides a natural framework to answer several questions: why do supply relations vary across industries and across firms within industries? Why aren t all large rms vertically integrated? How do changes in the properties of uncertainty at rm level determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of an industry? We fi nd that higher uncertainty is associated with higher likelihood of outsourcing; vertically integrated rms are larger and more efficient; otherwise identical downstream fi rms may differ in their vertical structure, and those that are vertically integrated can end up disintegrated or remain integrated. We also analyze the effects of changes in costs of vertical integration and outsourcing on welfare, aggregate output and productivity. In the second chapter, Dual Employment Protection Legislation and the Size Distribution of Firms , (joint paper with Andrés Erosa), we develop a theoretical model of rm dynamics with search frictions and asymmetric ring costs for temporary and permanent workers (dual employment protection legislation). We characterize the equilibrium labor composition that firms with different productivity growth rate choose over their life cycle, and we study the effect of dual employment protection legislation on the distribution of rms size and productivity. The results indicate that high relative ring costs for permanent workers play similar role as a tax to big rms and a subsidy to small rms (size-dependent-policies) by distorting fi rm selection as well as the allocation of resources across firms. Therefore, changes in the regulation that induce a higher use of temporary workers generate a decline in the level of TFP. Consistent with the evidence also documented in this paper, in spite of having similar labor productivity by fi rms size-classes, countries with dual employment protection legislation that incentives or extend the use of temporary contracts have relatively smaller firms (that concentrate a higher fraction of employment), and lower aggregate productivity. In this sense the model gives new insights into the sources of the considerable differences in the fi rm-size distributions across countries. In the third chapter, Size-Dependent Policies and Vertical Integration , motivated by the fact that developing countries have fewer vertically integrated fi rms than more developed countries; and vertically integrated rms are more productive and bigger, I develop a dynamic model of an industry with heterogeneous fi rms interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs, endogenous vertical integration, and market frictions. In the model economy, the vertical industrial structure emerges endogenously as the result of optimal investment decisions that firms undertake. I calibrate the model to the US economy to quantify the impact of size-dependent policies on the reallocation of resources across firms determining differences in total factor productivity. Size-dependent policies are modeled as taxes on output or labor costs that establishments above a certain size have to pay. Distortions on production and employment generate a reallocation of resources (employment) from big firms to small fi rms and act as barriers to vertical integration. I fi nd that a 15% output tax on firms that are above mean level of productivity generates a decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from 8.7% to 7%, a decrease in TFP of 2.9%, and an increase of 11% in the mean size of firms. A 15% tax on employment generates a decline in the fraction of vertically integrated firms from 8.6% to 7.1%, a decrease in TFP of 2.4% and a decline of 1.2% in the mean size of firms
Description
Keywords
Modelo económico, Industria, Política industrial, Productividad, Integración vertical