Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism

Publication:
Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Dhillon, Amrita
dc.contributor.editor	Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned	2009-04-08T09:34:13Z
dc.date.available	2009-04-08T09:34:13Z
dc.date.issued	1995-07
dc.description.abstract	This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of two other axioms: Anonymity and Weak IIA* it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called Relative Utilitarianism that consists of normalizing individual utilities between zero and one and then adding them.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3912
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries	1995-24-15
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.subject.other	Group Preferences
dc.subject.other	Multi-profile
dc.title	Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication