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On the competitive effects of divisionalization

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.authorGonzález-Maestre, M.
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-13T09:44:17Z
dc.date.available2009-03-13T09:44:17Z
dc.date.issued2000-01
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in a homogeneous good market. Assuming identical firms and constant returns to scale, we prove that the strategic interaction of firms yields Perfect Competition if the number of firms is beyond some critical level. Assuming a fixed cost per firm and an upper bound on the maximum number of divisions, we show that when this upper bound tends to infinity and the fixed cost tends to zero, market equilibrium may yield either Perfect Competition or a Natural Oligopoly.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationMathematical Social Sciences. (Enero 2000), vol. 39, nº 1, p. 71-80
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00047-X
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/3813
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00047-X
dc.rights& 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL20
dc.subject.jelL40
dc.subject.otherDivisionalization
dc.subject.otherOligopoly
dc.titleOn the competitive effects of divisionalization
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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