Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo

Publication:
Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author	Triossi, Matteo
dc.contributor.editor	Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-09T11:41:44Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-09T11:41:44Z
dc.date.issued	2005-11
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.
dc.format.extent	314986 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.repec	we057136
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/365
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.hasversion	http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/13427
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2005-36
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.subject.other	Teoría de juegos
dc.subject.other	Toma de decisiones
dc.subject.other	Economía del bienestar
dc.title	Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication