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Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorDe Sinopoli, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorIannantuoni, Giovanna
dc.date.accessioned2006-11-09T11:38:48Z
dc.date.available2006-11-09T11:38:48Z
dc.date.issued2005-05
dc.description.abstractWe study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
dc.format.extent235276 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe053421
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/349
dc.language.isoeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries2005-21
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleExtreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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