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The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorEiny, Ezra
dc.contributor.authorMoreno, Diego
dc.contributor.authorShitovitz, Benyamin
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-14T15:17:09Z
dc.date.available2009-05-14T15:17:09Z
dc.date.issued2003-08
dc.description.abstractWe derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGames and Economic Behavior. 2003, vol. 44, nº 2, p. 272–285
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00028-9
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/4226
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00028-9
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleThe value of public information in a Cournot duopoly
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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