The efficiency of decentralized and centralized markets for lemons

Publication:
The efficiency of decentralized and centralized markets for lemons

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Moreno, Diego
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, John
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-09T11:06:22Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-09T11:06:22Z
dc.date.issued	2001-01
dc.description.abstract	In markets with adverse selection, when average quality is low and frictions are small decentralized trade produces a greater surplus than predicted by the competitive model: under decentralized trade some high-quality units of the good trade whereas, due to the "lemons problem", only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium. This suggests a reason why these markets are often decentralized. Remarkably, under some conditions payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish, even though all qualities trade.
dc.format.extent	447766 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.repec	we014005
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/251
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2001-05
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	The efficiency of decentralized and centralized markets for lemons
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication