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Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21425
ISSN: 0010-485X (Print)
ISSN: 1436-5057 (Online)
ISBN: 978-3-319-09580-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09581-3_6
UXXI: CC/0000022622
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fair_LNCS_2014_ps.pdf (662.05 KB)
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2014-05
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Springer
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Abstract
Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose use payments in order to deal with selfishness. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.
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Proceeding of: Second International Conference,Networked Systems (NETYS 2014), took place 2014. May 15-17. in Marrakech, Morocco.
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Computer Communication Networks, Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity, Linking mechanism, Fairness, Resource allocation
Bibliographic citation
International Conference on Networked Systems: NETYS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8593 (2014) pp. 70-83
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