RT Conference Proceedings
T1 Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
A1 Santos, Agustín
A1 Fernández Anta, Antonio
A1 Cuesta, José A.
A1 López Fernández, Luis
AB Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose use payments in order to deal with selfishness. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.
PB Springer
SN 978-3-319-09580-6
SN 0010-485X (Print)
SN 1436-5057 (Online)
YR 2014
FD 2014-05
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21425
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21425
LA eng
NO Proceeding of: Second International Conference,Networked Systems (NETYS 2014), took place  2014. May 15-17. in Marrakech, Morocco.
DS e-Archivo
RD 17 jul. 2024