Publication: Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de EconomĂa | es |
dc.contributor.author | Romero-Medina, Antonio | |
dc.contributor.author | Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria | |
dc.contributor.funder | Comunidad de Madrid | es |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de EconomĂa y Competitividad (España) | es |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España) | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-13T09:34:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-13T09:34:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-03 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | We thank the associate editor and the two reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. Both authors acknowledge financial support from Ministerio EconomĂa y Competitividad (Spain) under project ECO2017-87769-P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from Ministerio EconomĂa y Competitividad (Spain) MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid H2019/HUM-5891. Triossi acknowledges the financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de EconomĂa, Fomento y Turismo (Chile), and from Ca' Foscari University of Venice under project MAN.INS_TRIOSSI. | en |
dc.format.extent | 14 | |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Romero-Medina, A. & Triossi, M. (2020). Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), pp. 105–118. | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-7276 | |
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage | 105 | |
dc.identifier.publicationissue | 1 | |
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage | 118 | |
dc.identifier.publicationtitle | International Journal of Game Theory | en |
dc.identifier.publicationvolume | 50 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/33439 | |
dc.identifier.uxxi | AR/0000028309 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Springer Nature | en |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. ECO2017-87769-P | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Comunidad de Madrid. H2019/HUM-5891 | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. MDM-2014-0431 | es |
dc.rights | © The Author(s) 2020. | en |
dc.rights | Atribución 3.0 España | * |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | en |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.subject.eciencia | EconomĂa | es |
dc.subject.other | Acyclicity | en |
dc.subject.other | Many-to-many | en |
dc.subject.other | Stability | en |
dc.subject.other | Strategy-proofness | en |
dc.title | Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets | en |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | VoR | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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