Publication:
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorTriossi Verondini, Matteo Maria
dc.contributor.funderComunidad de Madrides
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)es
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-13T09:34:45Z
dc.date.available2021-10-13T09:34:45Z
dc.date.issued2021-03
dc.description.abstractWe study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.en
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank the associate editor and the two reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. Both authors acknowledge financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under project ECO2017-87769-P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid H2019/HUM-5891. Triossi acknowledges the financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo (Chile), and from Ca' Foscari University of Venice under project MAN.INS_TRIOSSI.en
dc.format.extent14
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationRomero-Medina, A. & Triossi, M. (2020). Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), pp. 105–118.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage105
dc.identifier.publicationissue1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage118
dc.identifier.publicationtitleInternational Journal of Game Theoryen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume50
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/33439
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000028309
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Natureen
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2017-87769-Pes
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. H2019/HUM-5891es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. MDM-2014-0431es
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2020.en
dc.rightsAtribución 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.otherAcyclicityen
dc.subject.otherMany-to-manyen
dc.subject.otherStabilityen
dc.subject.otherStrategy-proofnessen
dc.titleTwo-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching marketsen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionVoR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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