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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/33439
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1
UXXI: AR/0000028309
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Two-sided_IJGT_2021.pdf (341.33 KB)
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2021-03
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Springer Nature
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We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
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Acyclicity, Many-to-many, Stability, Strategy-proofness
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Romero-Medina, A. & Triossi, M. (2020). Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), pp. 105–118.
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