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Counting on my vote not counting: expressive voting in committees

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35427
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104555
UXXI: AR/0000028918
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counting_JOPE_2022_ps.pdf (2.07 MB)
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2022-01-01
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Elsevier
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Abstract
How do voting institutions affect incentives of committees to vote expressively? We model a committee that chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all members pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members may have different depths of reasoning. Under certain sufficient conditions, the model predicts that features that reduce the probability of a member being pivotal-namely, larger committee size, or a more restrictive voting rule-raise the share of votes in favour of the proposal. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing presents evidence in line with these results. Our structural estimation recovers the distributions of altruistic and expressive preferences, as well as of depth of reasoning, across individuals
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Expressive voting, Committees, Pivotality, Laboratory Experiment, Level-K, Structural estimation
Bibliographic citation
Ginzburg, B., Guerra, J.-A., & Lekfuangfu, W. N. (2022). Counting on my vote not counting: Expressive voting in committees. Journal of Public Economics, 205, pp. 104555
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