RT Journal Article
T1 Counting on my vote not counting: expressive voting in committees
A1 Ginzburg, Boris
A1 Guerra, Jose Alberto
A1 Lekfuangfu, Nuarpear
AB How do voting institutions affect incentives of committees to vote expressively? We model a committee that chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all members pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members may have different depths of reasoning. Under certain sufficient conditions, the model predicts that features that reduce the probability of a member being pivotal-namely, larger committee size, or a more restrictive voting rule-raise the share of votes in favour of the proposal. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing presents evidence in line with these results. Our structural estimation recovers the distributions of altruistic and expressive preferences, as well as of depth of reasoning, across individuals
PB Elsevier
SN 0047-2727
YR 2022
FD 2022-01-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35427
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35427
LA eng
NO Financial support from CBEE, Chulalongkorn University; CEDE, Universidad de los Andes(grant P17.223622.010/01); Spanish Ministry of the Economy (grant MDM 2014-0431); Spanish Ministryof Science and Innovation (AEI/10.13039/501100011033), and Comunidad de Madrid (grant S2015/HUM-3444) is gratefully acknowledged.
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024