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On the optimality of not allocating

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/20439
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
UXXI: AR/0000015939
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optimality_hernando_EL_2014_ps.pdf (456.5 KB)
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2014-11
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Elsevier
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Abstract
We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.
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Auctions, Efficiency, Mechanism design
Bibliographic citation
Economics Letters (2014). 125(2), 233-235.
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