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On the optimality of not allocating

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorHernando-Veciana, Ángeles
dc.contributor.authorMichelucci, Fabio
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-16T11:02:03Z
dc.date.available2015-04-16T11:02:03Z
dc.date.issued2014-11
dc.description.abstractWe show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.en
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2012- 38863.en
dc.description.statusPublicadoes
dc.format.extent8 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationEconomics Letters (2014). 125(2), 233-235.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage233
dc.identifier.publicationissue2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage235
dc.identifier.publicationtitleEconomics lettersen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume125
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/20439
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000015939
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2012-38863.es
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
dc.rights© 2014 Elsevier B.Ven
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelD44
dc.subject.jelD82
dc.subject.otherAuctionsen
dc.subject.otherEfficiencyen
dc.subject.otherMechanism designen
dc.titleOn the optimality of not allocatingen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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