Publication: Implementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted Matching Market
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1998
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Springer
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Abstract
I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The
system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed
to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism
implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student’s
optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students’
optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of “non-reverse” preferences. All
these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to
misrepresent their preferences.
Description
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords
Matching markets, Implementation
Bibliographic citation
Review of Economic Design. July 1998, vol. 3, nº 2, p. 137-147