Publication:
Implementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted Matching Market

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-19T09:07:49Z
dc.date.available2012-10-19T09:07:49Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.descriptionThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
dc.description.abstractI analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student’s optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students’ optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of “non-reverse” preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and DGCYT under project PB 92–0590, is gratefully acknowleged.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationReview of Economic Design. July 1998, vol. 3, nº 2, p. 137-147
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s100580050009
dc.identifier.issn1434-4750
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage137
dc.identifier.publicationissue2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage147
dc.identifier.publicationtitleReview of Economic Design
dc.identifier.publicationvolume3
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/5583
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580050009
dc.rights© Springer
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelC71
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD78
dc.subject.jelJ24
dc.subject.otherMatching markets
dc.subject.otherImplementation
dc.titleImplementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted Matching Market
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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