Publication: Deuda bancaria y deuda negociable : un estudio para las empresas españolas
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2004-04
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Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas
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Abstract
N este trabajo se razona que la decisión de emitir deuda negociable por parte de las empresas genera una reducción en los costes financieros de origen bancario que éstas soportan. Fundamentamos este hecho a partir de tres argumentos: i) la posible delegación en el mercado de la supervisión que deberían llevar a cabo los bancos, con lo que se abaratan los costes de supervisión de estos últimos; ii) el incremento en el poder de negociación de las empresas emisoras de deuda respecto de los bancos, al utilizar las primeras canales de financiación alternativos al bancario; iii) la posibilidad de que la emisión de deuda sea interpretada como una señal positiva sobre la calidad de la empresa. Asimismo, argumentamos que dicho efecto es menos importante en las emisiones de deuda sucesivas, especialmente si son a corto plazo. Contrastamos empíricamente este y otros resultados afines utilizando la base de datos SABE para el período 1993-1998 y comprobamos que las hipótesis teóricas tienen un respaldo empírico.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This paper shows the existence of a positive relationship between the issue of public debt and the reduction of firm's banking cost. This feature relies on three main arguments. First, banks can delegate to investors the supervision task, a fact that makes bank supervision les s costly. Second, the issue of public debt increases firms' bargaining power in front of the banks, as the former can get funds through nonbank financing channels. Third, banks with no prior information on the issuing firm may interpret the issue of public debt as a positive signal of firm's quality. Additionally, we argue that the aforementioned effects are sensible to the maturity of the bond issued as well as to the existence of previous bond issues. We empirically test these and other related theoretical results making use of the SABE database during the 1993-1998 periodo We find empirical support for our theoretical contentions.
This paper shows the existence of a positive relationship between the issue of public debt and the reduction of firm's banking cost. This feature relies on three main arguments. First, banks can delegate to investors the supervision task, a fact that makes bank supervision les s costly. Second, the issue of public debt increases firms' bargaining power in front of the banks, as the former can get funds through nonbank financing channels. Third, banks with no prior information on the issuing firm may interpret the issue of public debt as a positive signal of firm's quality. Additionally, we argue that the aforementioned effects are sensible to the maturity of the bond issued as well as to the existence of previous bond issues. We empirically test these and other related theoretical results making use of the SABE database during the 1993-1998 periodo We find empirical support for our theoretical contentions.
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Keywords
Deuda bancaria, Deuda negociable, Bank debt, Public debt
Bibliographic citation
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad, n. 121, abril-junio 2004, pp. 465-498