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Essays on auction theory

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dc.contributor.advisorFrutos Casado, María Ángeles de
dc.contributor.authorLoyola Fuentes, Gino Gustavo
dc.contributor.departamentoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-18T13:10:40Z
dc.date.available2009-09-18T13:10:40Z
dc.date.issued2008-04
dc.date.submitted2008-07-22
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller's expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller's expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/5244
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherSubasta
dc.subject.otherMercados
dc.titleEssays on auction theory
dc.typedoctoral thesis*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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