Publication: Converging to efficiency : the Ramón y Cajal Program experience
Loading...
Identifiers
Publication date
2007-06
Defense date
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish
Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the first calls of the Program, an eligibility
requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research institution.
This requirement was removed in the fourth call. We model the recruiting process as a twosided
matching model to find the reason for the new design. We model the situation as if
research centers decided by majority to play either the old or the new mechanism. Our results
prove that in a repeated game and assuming that research personnel is scarce, even endogamic
centers will prefer the new mechanism after a finite number of calls. We also analyze
application data for the first five calls, finding empirical support to our assumptions and
theoretical findings.
Description
Keywords
Two-sided matching, Stable matching, R&D, Policy analysis, Differences in differences, Ramon y Cajal Program