Publication:
Electing a parliament

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/712
ISSN: 2340-5031
Files
we0733192.pdf (260.76 KB)
Publication date
2007-04
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems.
Description
Keywords
Majority election, Proportional election, Perfect equilibria
Bibliographic citation
Collections
DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online