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Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5607
ISSN: 1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6846-0
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equitable_romero-medina_TAD_2005_ps.pdf (571.25 KB)
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2005
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Springer
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Abstract
This paper presents a procedure to select equitable stable allocations in two-sided matching markets without side payments. The Equitable set is computed using the Equitable algorithm. The algorithm limits the set of options available for each agent throughout the procedure. The stable matchings selected are generally not extreme, form a lattice and satisfy the condition of being “Ralwsian” in each partition of the market. The Equitable algorithm can also be used to select a particular matching from the Equitable Set favoring particular agents independent of the side of the market to which they belong.
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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords
Matching markets, Fair distribution, Fair algorithm
Bibliographic citation
Theory and Decision. 2005, vol. 58, nº 3, p. 305 - 324
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DE - Artículos de Revistas
Economists Online