Political Regimes, Bureaucracy, and Scientific Productivity

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dc.contributor.author Remo Fernández-Carro, Juan
dc.contributor.author Lapuente Giné, Víctor
dc.date.accessioned 2009-10-15T08:16:59Z
dc.date.available 2009-10-15T08:16:59Z
dc.date.issued 2008-11
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Politics & Policy, 2008, vol.36, nº6, p. 1006-1043.
dc.identifier.issn 1555-5623
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5471
dc.description.abstract Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay to public scientists. We propose a simple game-theoretic model for understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments (democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not optimal since they have low-powered incentives (in contrast to the highpowered private-sector type of contracts) and run against scientists’ responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second-best solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of governments’ misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific productivity with reliable governments (democracies).
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Wiley-Blackwell
dc.rights ©2009 Policy Studies Organization
dc.title Political Regimes, Bureaucracy, and Scientific Productivity
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00148.x
dc.subject.eciencia Sociología
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00148.x
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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