A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency

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dc.contributor.author Jerez, Belén
dc.contributor.other CSIC
dc.contributor.other UAB
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-25T08:48:22Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-25T08:48:22Z
dc.date.issued 2001
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5324
dc.description.abstract We show that incentive e cient allocations in economies with adverse se- lection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete charac- terization of the optima. Our dual analysis identi es welfare e ects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare e ects may generate non-convexities, incentive e cient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive e cient allocations are also derived.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries UFAE and IAE
dc.subject.other asymetric information
dc.subject.other incentive efficiency
dc.subject.other linear programming
dc.subject.other duality
dc.title A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency
dc.type working paper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights open access
dc.affiliation.dpto UC3M. Departamento de Economía
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